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TEXT:
[*119] I. INTRODUCTION
The Arabic language was used in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula for centuries before the Qur'an was
revealed to Prophet Muhammad in 610 CE. In its early developmental phase, Arabic was influenced by Aramaic and
Syriac, which was a derivative language of Aramaic. Because Arabic was the language of a Bedouin and mostly
nomadic society, it was essentially spoken. Arabic's oral tradition was by far more developed than its written one. Thus,
when the Qur'an was memorized by the Prophet's companions, or sahaba, it had seven acknowledged readings, or
qeraat, because written Arabic did not then have vowels or diacritical marks. By reciting the Qur'an in seven different
ways, words could be given different meanings. This situation remained until 644 CE when Uthman Ibn Affan, the third
Khalifa, n1 had a group of learned sahaba redact the authoritative version of the Qur'an, which has since remained
unchanged and unchallenged. n2
Early Arabic was not as developed a language as it became after the Qur'an's revelation was completed in 632 CE,
and more so some 100 years later when vowels and diacritical signs became common usage in the written Arabic.
Thereafter, the language developed along two paths: the sacred as it relates to the exegesis of the Qur'an and the hadith,
n3 (sayings of the Prophet), and the [*120] popular--both written and spoken--in the different Arabic-speaking
countries. The former has remained more or less constant though developing in sophistication and richness. The latter
has changed and reflects the cultural diversity of the countries where it is spoken.
The inhabitants of the mostly desert area of southern Arabia consisted of tribal societies, some nomadic herders,
and others engaged in caravan commerce and other commercial endeavors. This brought them in contact with Jews and
Christians who were Aramaic speaking, as well as with other sedentary Semitic groups who inhabited the northern parts
bordering on the Mediterranean and who spoke both Aramaic and Syriac. The pre-Islamic Arab culture with the
contributions of other cultures had an important influence on the understanding and application of Islam in the region of
its birth. This Arab influence to date has marked the evolution of Islam's application in non-Arab Muslim societies.
The sacred Arabic, for approximately the first three-hundred years of Islam, was influenced by theologians and
jurists who tended to interpret the Qur'an and the hadith in ways that reflected the spiritual meaning and philosophy of
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Islam. Subsequently, exegesis was heavily influenced by language experts who understandably tended to be literalists.
In time, the literalists consolidated their intellectual dominance of exegesis and that had a profound effect on how the
interpretation of jihad has evolved.
The nature of jihad--its scope and means--has evolved since the days of the Prophet, often reflecting political
realities. During the Prophet's days, jihad was a call to put everything a person could into the service of Islam, and that
included use of force in self-defense. With few exceptions, the spiritual dimension was the predominant aspect of jihad's
meaning at that later time. n4 Jihad became a state doctrine which legitimized preemptive self-defense and justified
conquest. It also evolved into a doctrine supporting the use of force in the name of political legitimacy. Throughout the
centuries, competing claimants to the khilafa resorted to it in their struggles for power. This doctrinal extension of jihad
has reached an entirely new level since the nineteenth century, when it became a justification for regime-change.
Groups seeking to accomplish regime-change advanced it as moral justification for their violent means, even when
[*121] these means violated fundamental tenets of Islam, covering the protection of non-combatants. n5 Over time,
manipulation of jihad's meaning has distorted that aspect of the Shari'ah. This was possible because such manipulators
of religious doctrine were allowed to do so by the official clergy and by timid or complacent governments. n6 This
situation enhanced public acceptance of jihadist violence as a means to achieve what these jihadist groups perceive to be
legitimate ends. Thus, the end was deemed to justify the means. n7
Admittedly, the record of jihad is far from clear, and the Muslim religious establishment has historically failed to
clarify it. Thus, the contemporary politicization of jihad is due in part to the absence of a coherent and authoritative
doctrinal body of interpretation on the subject. Credible secular Muslim scholars have also failed to counterbalance the
views of politically and economically motivated clerics with reform notions of jihad. As result, jihad as political
violence has become nothing more than a revolutionary doctrine to justify those who engage in it by appealing to the
legitimacy of their self-proclaimed ends. n8
There is a debate among Western academics as to whether violence is endemic to Islam or whether Islam is a
peaceful religion. Proponents of these views are largely influenced by their own political persuasions, but mostly by
their perceptions as outside observers of the Muslim world. The most plausible [*122] conclusions are advanced by
those who simply see Muslim societies as any other society wrestling with social, economic, cultural, and political
issues, and where at different times ideology is resorted to as a way of justifying political transformation. In some cases,
Islamic doctrine is used as a legitimizing basis for political violence, and in these cases, it simply becomes the
equivalent of any other revolutionary idea. n9
The following interpretation of jihad and its evolving doctrinal nature should not be construed as an apology or
rationalization of its worst applications. There are contradictions in the evolving doctrines and applications of jihad
throughout Islam's fifteen centuries. These uncorrected contradictions by responsible Muslim clergy have led to the
contemporary rationalizations of unbridled violence in the name of Islamic jihad. Such doctrines and their contemporary
applications should be unequivocally rejected and condemned.
II. THE MEANINGS OF JIHAD
The Arabic word "jihad" means striving, endeavoring, and struggling. The person who engages in jihad, is the one
who jahada. Jihad is the noun of the verb jahada. Jahada is commonly understood as someone who is diligent,
industrious, or laborious in the pursuit of a praiseworthy objective. These terms apply equally [*123] to spiritual,
intellectual, and physical endeavors, n10 but reflect a higher purpose in the pursuit of the undertaking. Thus, the
value-oriented goal of the undertaking is its moral content.
The verb ijtihad means the process of engaging in a diligent, industrious, and laborious endeavor. But it has
acquired, since early Islam, an essentially theological significance because it applied to the intellectual process of
developing an interpretation concerning a particular problem for which the Shari'ah does not have an explicit answer.
n11 As to the mujtahid, it is the person who engages in intellectual ijtihad.
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In the pre-Islamic period of the jahiliyya, the words jihad, mujahid (the one who actively struggles), and mujtahid
were commonly used for physical and intellectual endeavors not necessarily associated with war-making, though in
time the former became just that. For the jahiliyya Arabs, war was permissible as an extension of political and other
tribal goals except when war was a breach of treaty or other tribal and customary obligations. n12 However, jahiliyya
Arabs had a customary code of conduct in war much like what developed over a millennium later in Europe's middle
ages, namely, the codes of chivalry. n13 Arab warriors were not to kill non-combatants, which included women,
children, and the aged, as well as the wounded and the sick if they asked to be spared death. The custom that Arab
Muslims of the Peninsula inherited from jahiliyya Arabs became part of Muslim law of conduct in warfare and jihad.
n14

[*124] The common usage meaning of words relating to jihad started to change after the Revelations and
particularly during the Prophet's lifetime as he was confronted by the enemies of Islam while seeking to establish a
Muslim state. The earlier period of Islam in Makkah (613-622 CE), before the Prophet and his followers' migration to
Madinah (622 CE), was essentially a period in which Muslim converts stoically withstood the Makkans' pressures and
persecutions. Thus, the term jihad essentially connoted the steadfast spiritual struggle in upholding the newly-acquired
faith. The Qur'an, which was revealed between 610 and 632 CE in Makkah and Madinah (with a few exceptions in
locations between these two cities), contains several references to jihad--some of which have the distinct meaning of
war-like activities in defense of the faith. During the first twenty-two years of Islam, the military dimension of jihad
meant resistance to aggression, in other words, self-defense. n15 Nevertheless, the spiritual aspects of jihad were
prevalent, particularly as practiced by the early Makkan Muslims between 610 and 622 CE. This spiritual dimension
was reflected in a hadith of the Prophet who, after returning from the battle of Badr, n16 referred to war as the smaller
jihad, in contrast to the struggle against oneself for goodness and piety, referred to as jihad ul-nafs--the greater jihad.
n17

Over the last fourteen centuries, fiqh (doctrine) did not elaborate much on the Prophet's hadith, which focused on
the non-spiritual aspects of jihad ul-nafs (the struggle against self). The reason may well be that this spiritual aspect of
jihad, which the Prophet considered the greater one, is self-evident, and thus needed no elaboration. Indeed, much of the
Qur'an and the hadith deal with how to reach a higher spiritual plane through iman (faith), 'aqida (belief), and taqwa
(piety). Conversely, the struggle against non-believers in the early days of Islam, who either wanted to crush Islam (as
the Makkans) or simply oppose it, needed a doctrinal basis for the armed struggle facing the Muslims. Various doctrines
developed as to when resort to the use of force could be considered jihad and [*125] when it could not, and also
against whom it is permitted. n18 Doctrine also discussed how to deal with apostates, polytheists, and others who
opposed Islam, as well as those who undermined it from within, whom the Qur'an refers to as the "hypocrites"
(al-munafiqun). n19 It is significant to note that all doctrinal discussions of jihad distinguish its meaning as a struggle in
the military sense from its meaning of the personal, spiritual, and moral struggle for the attainment of Islam's spiritual
ends. However, strong revisionist doctrinal trends started to become evident after the Prophet's death in 632 CE.
During the Prophet's time, the Qur'an's revelations mentioning jihad were essentially found in twenty-four verses.
Most of the verses, quoted below, urge a more spiritual and non-violent aspect of the concept of jihad. Most of the
Qur'an's exhortations are to being steadfast in the faith, to sacrifice for the faith, to migrate from Makkah to Madinah,
and to peacefully propagate the faith. Several verses specifically refer to personal and financial sacrifices. In
comparison to the above-mentioned spiritual exhortations, a few verses specifically address jihad as armed resistance to
the enemies of Islam. Resort to use of force as part of jihad was, however, always contemplated.
The verses quoted below in their entirety are intended to give the reader a better feeling of the Divine message than
what this writer may convey. The reader will also note a change in tone and content between the Madinah-revealed
verses and the subsequent Makkah-revealed ones.
The following Madinah-revealed verses balance personal sacrifice and fighting in self-defense.
Surat al-Baqarah: Those who believed and those who suffered exile and fought [and strove and
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struggled] in the path of Allah--they have the hope of the Mercy of Allah: And Allah is Oft-forgiving,
Most Merciful. n20
Surat al-Nisa': Not equal are those believers who sit [at home] and receive no hurt, and those who strive
and fight in the cause of Allah with their goods and their persons. Allah hath granted a grade higher to
those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit [at home]. Unto all [*126]
[in Faith] Hath Allah promised good: But those who strive and fight Hath He distinguished above those
who sit [at home] by a special reward. n21
Surat al-Ma'idah: O ye who believe! Do your duty to Allah, seek the means of approach unto Him, and
strive with might and main in his cause: that ye may prosper ... n22 O ye who believe! if any from among
you turn back from his Faith, soon will Allah produce a people whom He will love as they will love
Him,- lowly with the believers, mighty against the rejecters, fighting in the way [service] of Allah, and
never afraid of the reproaches of such as find fault. That is the grace of Allah, which He will bestow on
whom He pleaseth. And Allah encompasseth all, and He knoweth all things. n23
Surat al-Anfal: Those who believed, and adopted exile, and fought for the Faith, with their property and
their persons, in the cause of Allah, as well as those who gave [them] asylum and aid, these are [all]
friends and protectors, one of another. As to those who believed but came not into exile, ye owe no duty
of protection to them until they come into exile; but if they seek your aid in religion, it is your duty to
help them, except against a people with whom ye have a treaty of mutual alliance. And [remember]
Allah seeth all that ye do. n24
Surat al-Tawbah: Do ye make the giving of drink to pilgrims, or the maintenance of the Sacred Mosque,
equal to [the pious service of] those who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and strive with might and
main in the cause of Allah? They are not comparable in the sight of Allah: and Allah guides not those
who do wrong ... n25 Those who believe, and suffer exile and strive with might and main, in Allah's
cause, with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of Allah: they are the people
who will achieve [salvation] ... n26 Say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your mates,
or your kindred; the wealth that ye have gained; the commerce in which ye fear a decline: or the
dwellings in which ye delight - are dearer to you than Allah, or His Messenger, or the striving in His
causes-then wait until Allah brings about His decision: and Allah guides not the rebellious ... n27 Those
who believe in Allah and the Last Day ask thee for no exemption from fighting with their goods and
persons. And Allah knoweth well those who do their duty ... n28 O Prophet! Strive hard against the
unbelievers and the Hypocrites, and be firm against them. Their abode is Hell, an evil refuge indeed. n29
[*127] Surat al-Hajj: And strive in His cause as ye ought to strive, [with sincerity and under discipline].
He has chosen you, and has imposed no difficulties on you in religion; it is the cult of your father
Abraham. It is He Who has named you Muslims, both before and in this [Revelation]; that the Messenger
may be a witness for you, and ye be witnesses for mankind! So establish regular Prayer, give regular
Charity, and hold fast to Allah! He is your Protector - the Best to protect and the Best to help! n30
Surat al-Hujurat: Only those are Believers who have believed in Allah and His Messenger, and have
never since doubted, but have striven with their belongings and their persons in the Cause of Allah: Such
are the sincere ones. n31
Surat al-Mumtahinak O ye who believe! Take not my enemies and yours as friends [or protectors],offering them [your] love, even though they have rejected the Truth that has come to you, and have [on
the contrary] driven out the Prophet and yourselves [from your homes], [simply] because ye believe in
Allah your Lord! If ye have come out to strive in My Way and to seek My Good Pleasure, [take them not
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as friends], holding secret converse of love [and friendship] with them: for I know full well all that ye
conceal and all that ye reveal. And any of you that does this has strayed from the Straight Path. n32
The chapters revealed in Makkah have a different content and tone. They are less conciliatory and more directive
toward violent action. They include the following:
Surat al-Furqan: Therefore listen not to the Unbelievers, but strive against them with the utmost
strenuousness, with the [Qur'an]. n33
Surat al-Ankabut: And if any [of you] strive, they do so for their own souls: for Allah is free of all needs
from all creation ... n34 And those who strive in Our [cause], We will certainly guide them to our Paths:
For verily Allah is with those who do right. n35
Surat al-Saff: That ye believe in Allah and His Messenger, and that ye strive [your utmost] in the Cause
of Allah, with your property and your persons: That will be best for you, if ye but knew! n36
The verses revealed in Madinah were conciliatory because that was the critical time when Islam's candle was
flickering and could have easily been snuffed out by the enemies of Islam. That was the time that required jihad in all of
its meanings and by all Muslims. It required: migrating from Makkah to [*128] Madinah, while leaving behind tribal
affiliation, family, work, house, and fortune; the inhabitants of Madinah to share their property with those who migrated
from Makkah and other places; Muslims to share what they had with new converts, proselytize, and set good examples;
and ultimately fighting in self-defense for survival. But this was also why later exegetes deemed the verses referring to
that period as being superseded by the subsequent Makkan verses. n37 In the case of jihad, the revelations subsequent in
time do not state that they supersede or abrogate prior ones, though admittedly they leave room for such an
interpretation.
The Qur'an in connection with jihad refers to qital (fighting) against the unbelievers. n38 The two issues debated by
exegetes are whether Muslims are to fight unbelievers at any and all times save for when there is a truce or a treaty, or
only in self-defense; and, whether this is a permanent injunction. The following verses are used by some interpreters of
the Qur'an to support this proposition that fighting the unbelievers, meaning all non-Muslims with whom there is no
truce or treaty, is a permanent undertaking for all Muslims. These verses are:
Surat al-Baqarah: Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah
loveth not transgressors ... n39 And fight them on until there is no more Tumult or oppression, and there
prevail justice and faith in Allah; but if they cease, Let there be no hostility except to those who practice
oppression. n40
[*129] Surat al-Anfal: And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail
justice and faith in Allah altogether and everywhere; but if they cease, verily Allah doth see all that they
do. n41
Surat al-Tawbah: But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye
find them, an seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they
repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is
Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful ... n42 But if they violate their oaths after their covenant, and taunt you for
your Faith, fight ye the chiefs of Unfaith: for their oaths are nothing to them: that thus they may be
restrained ... n43 Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which
hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they
are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves
subdued. n44
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These verses are relied upon by some interpreters of the Qur'an to have "abrogated" the earlier Madinah verses
quoted above. n45
The more warlike interpretations of jihad in the Makkan revelations are more consonant with the Atabjahiliyya
custom of war described above than with the spirit of peace, tolerance, and goodness reflected elsewhere in the Qur'an.
It is also these interpretations that are relied upon by contemporary political jihadist groups. n46
As stated above, the distinctive characteristic of armed jihad at the Prophet's time was self-defense. This was
particularly evident in the battles of Badr (624 CE) and Uhud (625 CE), where the Muslims were attacked by superior
forces, as well as in other battles. n47 But when the Muslims under the Prophet attacked Makkah in 630 CE, it was not
for self-defense but to take [*130] control of the Kaaba. n48 Justified as this may have been, it was not self-defense.
n49 Thereafter, jihad was used as a basis for conquest.
During Islam's post-Prophet period and until the end of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, jihad was mainly used in
support of conquests and internal power struggles within the Muslim nation. In the last half-century it ceased to be a
state doctrine and became the new legitimizing doctrine for non-state actors in search of a revolutionary doctrine for
regime-change. n50
III. DOCTRINAL EMPHASIS ON THE ARMED STRUGGLE ASPECT OF JIHAD
As stated above, warlike jihad originated as self-defense. When the Prophet and his followers were forced to leave
Makkah (622 CE), they were attacked by non-Muslims, and a verse of the Qur'an was revealed about the right to
self-defense against aggression: "Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged." n51 Later,
the Qur'an was more explicit:
Surat al-Baqarah: Fight in the way of God against those who fight against you, but do not begin
hostilities for God does not love aggression. And slay them wherever you find them [the aggressors], and
drive them out of their places whence they drove you out, for persecution is worse than slaughter. And
fight not with them in the Inviolable Place of Worship until they attack you, then slay them. Such is the
reward of disbelievers. n52
[*131] The Qur'an further states that "if they incline to peace, incline then also to it."

n53

The ahadith (plural of hadith) also contain many references to jihad as a military concept, though none advocate
aggressive violence. n54 Most of these reported ahadith reiterate the same concept, namely, that it is a great virtue to
fight for Islam and that such persons who do will be rewarded with heavenly graces.
Muslim scholars--from earlier periods of Islam n55 up to and including our contemporary era--have given
disproportionate emphasis to the warlike, rather than the spiritual and social, aspects of jihad. The reasons for this
emphasis are the interpretations given in the Qur'an and the hadith's references to jihad, which lent themselves to more
expansive interpretations than the ones given by the [*132] exegetics of the Madinah era. Subsequent doctrinal
approaches extrapolated from self-defense to pre-emptive self-defense, then to conquest, and then beyond that to
violence in pursuit of regime-change. n56
The early formative period of Islam--from 610 to 632 CE--was characterized by war between the Muslims and
other tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. It was also a period during which Islam's survival as a religion and as an ummah
(nation) was at stake. After the Prophet n57 established the ummah with its seat in Makkah in 630 CE, the distinction
between Dar el-Selm (the land of peace) and Dar el-Harb (the land of war) was developed. Dar el-Selm was the
territory controlled by Muslims or the territory where Muslims could freely practice and proselytize Islam. Dar el-Harb
was the territory controlled by non-Muslims, who, if they had no treaty with the Muslims or if they prohibited the
peaceful propagation of Islam, were presumed to be enemies of Islam. Dar el-Harb was where warlike jihad was to take
place, subject to many exceptions and also subject to many rules and constraints. n58 The exceptions included the
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existence of treaties; and whether the land was inhabited by dhimmis or People of the Book (namely, Christians and
Jews who paid tribute, or jizya, to the Muslims). Other exceptions emerged in the Practice of the Prophet and in the
practices of the first four Righteous Khalifas that followed him (633-61 CE). n59 But these reflected opportunistic and
political considerations more than religious doctrinal ones.
As the threat to the Islamic nations' existence abated between the eighth and twelfth centuries CE and more friendly
relations developed with other nations, new doctrinal limitations were imposed on the resort to jihad. Thus, the
propagation of Islam by peaceful means as the Prophet's Sunnah (practice) evidenced during his lifetime became the
rule and not the exception. This reflected the true spirit of Islam as expressed in the following explicit passage of the
Qur'an, rejecting compulsion in conversions in an explicit verse: "There is [*133] no compulsion in religion." n60 The
true spirit is also expressed in the following passage of the Qur'an addressing the People of the Book: "Those who
believe, and those who are Jews, Christians and Sabians--whoever believe in God and the Last Day and doeth
right--surely their reward is with their Lord, and there shall no fear come them, nor shall they grieve." n61
The Muslim's right to freedom of religion, including freedom to propagate it, was new in the seventh century, but it
is the norm in the contemporary era of human rights. n62 Only when that is prohibited by non-Muslims can there be a
call for jihad. Nevertheless, it should be noted that early interpretations of the right to propagate were also interpreted as
"convert or submit," which was a form of compulsion, except for the People of the Book, if they paid jizya or if they
had a treaty with the Muslim nation. n63
Later, Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd (d 1198), known in the West as Averroes, reminded
Muslims of the spirituality of jihad as expressed by the Prophet and argued that Islam's expansion was intended to be
[*134] by peaceful means. n64 However, political doctrines that derived from the Salafi movement n65 argued that
Muslims had to fulfill their duty by jihad. They interpreted the exhortations of the Qur'an and the hadith as a sacred and
permanent duty that is to be carried out by the collective as well as by every person able to carry it out. Thus it became a
dual obligation: a sacred permanent duty that is non-derogable, though postponable for reasons of practicality; and a
collective as well as an individual duty that did not need to be sanctioned by those in power. The sacred, permanent, and
non-derogable duty derives from the belief that every Muslim must struggle, including by violent means if peaceful
means are not sufficient, to establish Islam on Earth. In contemporary times, the proponents of this view believe that the
duty to establish Islam on earth extends to: stopping the decline of Islam within the Muslim ummah (whose meaning
includes smaller communities of Muslims); opposing corrupt or deviant Muslim leaders and regimes; confronting the
imperialistic/hegemonistic anti-Muslim forces; reconstituting the ideal Muslim ummah and restoring it to its earlier
greatness; and separating Muslim values, governance, and economic system from Western values and systems. It is this
doctrinal view that contemporary violent jihadists rely upon to advance what modern political scientists call
revolutionary doctrine.
IV. THE CONDITIONS AND LIMITS OF JIHAD
From the days of the Prophet, jihad was subject to conditions as to its rightfulness, which we would today call the
right to legitimate self-defense. But even so, legitimate use of force was also subject to limitations with respect to who
could order it, whether it was a right or a duty, who should be involved in it, and how it should be conducted. n66 The
latter question, namely the means by [*135] which jihad taking the form of war was to be conducted, was strictly
answered. Even in jihad, there were prohibitions against violence directed toward women, children, the elderly, the sick
and wounded, clerics, and places of worship of Christianity and Judaism. They were not, however, consistently
followed except in the days of the Prophet n67 and during some of the first four successors, and also throughout the
expansion of Islam in North Africa, Spain, and Southern Europe, and more particularly by the practices of Salah Al-Din
el-Ayyoubi in his war of liberation in Palestine and Syria against the crusaders. n68 Traditional Sunni doctrines
prevailed among Muslims until the Shi'a movement developed after the disputed khilafa of Ali ibn Abi Talib (599--661
CE), the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law (and who was assassinated by his political opponents, as was his predecessor).
Ali's followers claim that the khilafa could only follow from the Prophet's descendants. n69 The Shi'a movement
justified the use of force by Muslim against Muslim on the basis of legitimacy in the khilafa. This was the beginning of
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an ever-expanding extension of jihad to a variety of internal regime-changes, which has nothing to do with the original
self-defense doctrinal foundation of jihad.
Early Sunni doctrine, however, was that forceful jihad was only for self-defense and was a permissible use of force
against non-Muslim controlled areas where: a threat to the Muslim ummah could arise; the propagation and practice of
Islam was opposed; the non-Muslims refused to sign a treaty with the Muslim ummah; or the jizya was resisted by the
People of the Book. n70
Between the seventh and twelfth centuries CE, the four major Sunni schools of jurisprudence, their various
sub-schools, and the Shi'a scholars, whose approaches to the interpretation of the Shari'ah are in part different from the
Sunni, n71 developed various--though similar--doctrines of jihad. In time, however, the different schools and
sub-schools in both Sunni and Shi'a traditions came to different exegeses of Qur'an and hadith texts. Notwithstanding
these [*136] divergences, nearly all doctrines focused more on jihad's warlike aspects rather than on its spiritual
aspects, except for the ascetic spiritual Sufi movement which was essentially pacifist. n72 Most of these doctrines
extended jihad to justifiable aggression, something akin to contemporary doctrines of preemptive use of force. These
differences have subsequently been exploited by political fundamentalist doctrine which argues for the use of force as
part of internal regime-change, n73 and more recently, to justify indiscriminate violence against the US and Western
countries declared to be enemies of Islam. n74 Detractors of Islam, n75 as well as Orientalists, n76 focus heavily on the
warlike aspect of jihad as a way of discrediting Islam.
V. JIHAD IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE
The recent evolution of doctrinal pronouncements on jihad is mostly revealed in the pronouncements of politically
violent fundamentalist groups who lack the theological qualification to make such pronouncements. Even a cursory
reading of these alleged fatwa(s) justifying indiscriminate violence reveals on its face that, for all practical purposes,
jihad as the basis of a just war based on self-defense has all but disappeared.
The new nature of jihad surfaced within some groups in their struggle for independence during the colonial era
between the First and Second World Wars. n77 But the nationalist movements in Arab countries between 1920 and
1960, as well as in Asian Muslim countries, were not based on jihad. Thus, jihad in the de-colonization period was not a
salient part of the discourse legitimizing violence against foreign oppressors--national liberation was all the legitimacy
[*137] needed. Some politically engaged Sunni scholars of that time undertook the effort of distinguishing between
legitimate nationalist doctrine of war of national liberation and jihad. n78 The call to jihad was used by only a few who
wanted to stimulate religious fervor in the armed struggle against colonialism. But that was a small minority view at a
time when the secular nationalist movement was predominant between the 1920s and the 1960s. Subsequently, jihad
was expanded by some scholars and political doctrines to apply to the struggle against Muslim regimes deemed corrupt
and subservient to imperial and neo-imperial powers. By the time of the 1948 Palestine War, the Egyptian-based
Muslim Brotherhood (which in 1948 sent a unit to fight against what was then referred to as the Zionist settlers) started
calling the struggle for Palestine jihad. Thus they included in jihad's meaning certain contemporary nationalistic notions
pertaining to wars of national liberation. It follows that the contemporary Hamas movement in Palestine and Hezbollah
movement in Lebanon rely on jihad as a part of their doctrine of armed struggle against Israel. n79 There is no doubt,
however, that starting in 1948, there were many pronouncements by Al-Azhar University and by the Academy of
Islamic Research in Cairo and by other established Muslim religious institutions, that the struggle against Israel is in the
nature of jihad. But it would be enough to refute the validity of this transformation of jihad to point out that in Lebanon,
Israel, and Palestine, there is no issue pertaining to the freedom of practice and propagation of Islam. Israel's occupation
of Palestinian territories and, at one time, of Lebanese territories has nothing to do with the religion of Islam. This is
why the governments of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, all of which were at one time at war with Israel, never
claimed jihad as a legal basis for their wars with Israel. However, the views of Hezbollah, Hamas, and for that matter,
the popular view in most of the Muslim world is that Israel's de-population of Jerusalem, its creeping annexation of the
West Bank, and its repressive policies [*138] leading to the continued migration of Palestinian Muslims, fall within
the meaning of jihad for Islam.
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Since the end of the Second World War, Islamic fundamentalism, as it is derogatorily known in the West but not in
the Muslim world, has gained many adherents among the estimated 1.4 billion Muslims of the world. This is similar to
the phenomenon observed in other historical revolutionary movements against dictatorial and corrupt regimes. The
ideological dimension, however, was replaced with the religious one. n80 This approach led to the extension of the
armed struggle to domestic Muslim regimes deemed to have strayed from the proper application of the Shari'ah. Muslim
revolutionary groups thus selectively used a variety of doctrinal writings on jihad to justify their ends and to
misleadingly claim that these ends justify their means, even when these means are explicitly prohibited by the Shari'ah,
such as killing innocent civilians. n81
What characterizes all these doctrinal developments in internal Muslim power struggles is the search for the
legitimization of armed force against perceived enemies, domestic and foreign. This brought about new unorthodox
exegeses of Qur'anic and hadith texts. The blatant politicization of the permissible use of force under contemporary
political jihad doctrine, which was developed selectively by politically-motivated clerics and leaders of radical
movements advocating violence, is also accompanied by a rejection of traditional Shari'ah limitations on the ways and
means of conducting warfare. The proponents of these views ignore the correlative obligations that provide for
limitations on the permissible use of violence and on the targets against which such violence can be directed. In short,
resort to violence, as these groups justify it by extrapolations of traditional doctrines of jihad, overtakes the
well-established limits on the permissible means of violence, and not necessarily with regard to the grounds that must
exist to justify resort to violence. This is how assassinations and suicide bombings resulting in the deaths of innocent
civilians are improperly rationalized.
As violent revolutionary groups throughout the Muslim world broke up into smaller ones, each proclaiming its own
brand of jihad doctrine and pursuing violence by unrestricted means, their views acquired popular acceptance even
[*139] when these views were opposed by religious establishments. n82 Some of these groups adopted the practice of
simply declaring a given ruler to have become a kafir--meaning that he had strayed away from Islam, which they deem
equivalent to committing a crime punishable by death. n83 In this way, such groups justified assassinations and other
acts of impermissible violence. Other groups took to declaring that no person among their enemies is innocent, thus
justifying suicide bombings and other forms of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants. n84 Jihad became the
instrumentalized religious doctrinal basis for legitimizing those Islamic organizations' resort to unlawful violence as a
means either of achieving the ultimate goal of the ideal Islamic state or of fighting the enemies of Islam, be they
external or internal. n85 Thus, it has been carried out not only against domestic regimes, but also on an international
scale in what we call terrorism. n86
Assuming that jihad is the legitimate basis for what is referred to as the jus ad helium, it is still subject to the jus in
bello which, as stated above, was part of the Shari'ah long before it was part of Western international law. n87 As said
above, nothing in the Shari'ah or in jihad allows a breach of certain limits of the use of [*140] force. Moreover, in
addition to the Shad'ah, armed conflicts are regulated by positive law, n88 which is permissible under the Shari'ah.
The first application of human rights in Islam came about in what is commonly called the Treaty of Madina in the
first year of the hejira. n89 In this agreement between the Prophet and those who followed him in migration from
Makkah to Madina, as well as the different tribes belonging to different religions including Christians and Jews who
lived in and around Madina, a covenant was established providing for equality of all citizens before the law, supremacy
of the law for each religious community, non-discrimination between persons of different tribes and religions, and
guaranteed freedom of religion for Muslims, Christians and Jews. This was followed in the year 6 AH by the Treaty of
Hudeibiya between Muslims and their enemies in Makkah. n90 It provided for non-aggression, protection of life and
property, and prisoner exchange. The most noteworthy Muslim text applicable to the law of armed conflict is the
Admonition of Abu Bakr, the first khalifa of Islam after the death of the Prophet, to the Muslim troops before engaging
in the Syrian campaign, 12 AH. n91 This text is probably the closest to contemporary international humanitarian law,
but in view of the time of its promulgation, it is also the precursor of contemporary international humanitarian law. In it
there are specific admonishments for the protection of civilians in every respect, prohibitions against any attack or
destruction of civilian property, and the command to treating prisoners with dignity, including the prohibition of torture
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and other cruel or demeaning treatment. The Abu-Bakr instructions even prohibit cutting down fruit-bearing trees or
destroying crops belonging to the enemy. Lastly, the Jerusalem Pledge of Umar Ibn el-Khattab, second khalifa, 15 AH,
deserves mention. n92 This followed the defeat of the Romans at the Battle of Yarmouk in 638 CE which preceded the
Muslim army's entry into Jerusalem. Umar Ibn el-Khattab made a pledge on behalf of all Muslims and for all times to
protect the religious places of worship of Jews and Christians and to allow freedom of access to them by their respective
coreligionists. Subsequent practices, however, have not always evidenced the application of these early commandments,
though one positive example shines through in history, and that is the behavior of the [*141] Muslim army under Salah
Al Din el-Ayyoubi during the Second Crusade, where he treated the Christian crusaders with fairness and
humanity--something which the Crusaders had not done to the Muslims. n93
Since World War II, there have been a number of conflicts in which impermissible violence was used by state and
non-state actors. n94 The latter, because of the military imbalance and power asymmetry between non-state actors and
the occupying power or the established regimes, have resorted to unlawful use of violence as a means of redressing that
imbalance. In conflicts of a non-international character, which include de-colonization, regime-change and wars of
national liberation, the opposing sides have always advanced the legitimacy of their causes through labels which
connote legitimacy. Thus, what is jihad to some is terrorism to others, and what is self-defense to some is terrorism to
others. n95 Self-characterization of legitimate violence is not enough to justify the unlawful use of violence by any
party to a conflict, no matter how legitimate the cause may be. n96
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of Islam throughout its fifteen centuries has witnessed political turmoil and upheavals and also periods
of peace and stability, during which the sciences and the arts have made extraordinary strides and contributed
significantly to other civilizations. Political violence has existed in every civilization, and while this is not the place to
discuss comparative manifestations of political and cultural violence, the Muslim world has, in the last two hundred
years, suffered at the hands of Western imperial powers. Recently the Muslim world has started to selectively strike
back against the Western world, represented by the US responding in kind, thus fueling predictions of a "clash of
[*142] civilizations." n97 The mutual escalation of violations may well lead proponents of the proposition that there is
a conflict of civilizations between the Muslim world and the Judeo-Christian Western civilization to a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Against the backdrop of an anti-Islam and anti-Muslim campaign since September 11, 2001 by some
segments of the neo-conservatives, the Protestant Christian right, and others among American pro-Israel supporters,
Muslim masses have become more willing to accept the new anti-American and anti-Western approach to political
jihad. As stated above, jihad has become a revolutionary doctrine painted over with a broad-brush of theological color
to give it the appearance of legitimacy. This revolutionary doctrine can be explained by historic, social, political, and
economic events that have impacted the Muslim masses.
As of the sixteenth century CE, the power and influence of Muslims waned, and they became the ruled instead of
the rulers. Since the eighteenth century CE, Muslims became the dominated instead of the dominant. The post-colonial
era of the twentieth century was even more painful. It brought about independent Muslim states administered by corrupt
and inefficient national regimes frequently subservient to the prior colonial powers or to the new neo-imperial power,
the US. n98 To have been oppressed and exploited by foreign powers was bad enough for the Muslim masses, but to
continue being subjected to these conditions, and even worse, subjected to these conditions by their own leaders, is not
only painful but demeaning. As popular anger and frustration boils over throughout the Muslim world, inevitably
individuals and small groups of Muslims find new popular leaders who claim that violent jihad is a justified course of
conduct.
To some among the downtrodden masses, violence is seen as the only means of expression left to them. n99 From
there, it is only a small step to take their violence internationally. Their aim is particularly at America because they
perceive it as the source of the contemporary evils that befall the Muslims. They see America's policies as supporting
corrupt and inefficient regimes in the [*143] Muslim world, blindly supporting Israel even against the Palestinians'
most elementary rights, and bent on being anti-Muslim. To many in the Muslim world, violent jihad is the answer to
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their various predicaments irrespective of who the victims may be. Their legitimacy of purpose trumps all else--the end
justifying the means. In time, proponents of the strategy of terror-violence against the US and the West have acquired
credibility, not to say legitimacy, even though their strategy includes resorting to indiscriminate violence against
innocent civilians, which is in violation of Islamic precepts. Unjustifiable as these tactics are, their proponents see them
as the only way to balance the asymmetry of the forces they face. It is also perceived as the only way left to redress
injustices for which no other remedies seem forthcoming. This is the case in Palestine and Iraq.
As manifestations of violence by Muslims increase in different parts of the world, so do anti-Islam sentiments,
particularly in the Western world. In turn, this generates anti-Western reactions among Muslim masses. The invasions
of Afghanistan and Iraq and the use of torture by the US during the occupation of these countries and in Guantanamo
have contributed to negative Muslim reactions. n100 Reciprocal negative perceptions between the Western and Muslim
worlds continue to escalate, threatening peace and security in Muslim countries and elsewhere in the world.
The language of political violence has never been seriously studied in the Muslim world, even by governments who
have an extensive state security apparatus to combat religious extremism, such as in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Jordan.
There are no centers that study the language of violence and more particularly the relationship between the terminology
of violence and its public resonance and impact. The term jihad is surely a powerful one in the Muslim psyche. It
evokes the legitimate self-defense struggle of the Prophet and his followers in the glorious days of early Islam. What
can be more powerful and more moving to the downtrodden masses in the contemporary Muslim world than jihad?
These masses can see in this era of global communications what the modern world has to offer and of what then they
are deprived. But, if these masses could also see how frequently, how improvidently, and how dubiously the term jihad
has been used by unqualified political violence proponents, their reactions may well be different.
Surely mathematical formulas can be used to measure, for example, the frequency of use of the term jihad and its
connection to the echo of legitimate [*144] jihad. Social psychologists and psychologists can also contribute to the
understanding of the trigger-recall psychological mechanism in response to certain words and also, how word usage has
been transformed to suit political purposes. Until these socio-psychological responses are decrypted for the general
Muslim public, the new meanings of jihad will remain appealing. What is more self-empowering and uplifting than the
one word slogan of jihad to rally Muslims around the holy war against their historic and contemporary oppressors? n101
For the last two decades in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has successfully used a similar formula to frame its political
opposition to the Mubarak regime, namely, the slogan "Islam is the answer." As jurists have long known, it is how a
question or issue is framed that determines its outcome.
What needs to be emphasized is that the resort to force as part of jihad in the early days of Islam was justified on
the basis of self-defense and on the fact that there was no freedom to propagate Islam or for Muslims to practice it freely
in non-Muslim controlled areas. However, it must also be said that the history of Islam is characterized by recurring
violence claimed to be justified by jihad, even when it was not. To argue otherwise is revisionist history.
[*145] Whatever justifications may have existed throughout the history of Islam, jihad in the name of the
propagation of the faith can no longer be sustained in an era where freedom of religion, practice, thought, and speech
are internationally guaranteed human rights. n102 Thus, conflicts such as those between Palestinians and Israelis and
between Chechnyans and Russians cannot be characterized as jihad, since they do not involve the religion of Islam.
These conflicts are controlled by other aspects of Islamic law, which also recognizes in these cases the applicability of
positive law, namely, international humanitarian law. n103
Jihad in Islamic history has a mixed record. Quite clearly, however, it is subject to interpretation, and has been
subject to manipulations, essentially for political reasons or in order to achieve a political goal. It is also the subject of
different interpretations in the four traditional Sunni schools, as well as in the different Shi'a doctrines. Precisely
because of that mixed record, there is nothing that prevents the development of a contemporary doctrinal approach to
jihad which would be equivalent to the contemporary international law of self-defense subject to the limitations on the
methods and means of warfare in accordance with contemporary international humanitarian law. n104
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Freedom of religion is a basic human right universally recognized. No state, irrespective of its majority population's
religion, can violate the religious freedoms of others. n105 This applies to Muslim states as well as to others. The Qur'an
states in Surat al-Hujurat "O Mankind, We have created you male and female, and made you into tribes and nations,
that you may know one another (not that you may despise each other). Surely, the noblest among you in the sight of
God is the most righteous of you. God is All-knowing, All-aware." n106 This verse and others evidence the universality
of humankind, notwithstanding its diversity. Other verses of the Qur'an reveal that man was created with the spirit of the
Creator. How then can a believer in Islam engage in killing, torturing, and humiliating another human being created by
God and infused with His Divine Spirit? No political doctrine of jihad can override this higher religious value. And
[*146] yet tragically, this higher religious and humanistic value is violated with scant reaction from the Muslim
religious establishment and from knowledgeable secular Muslims intellectuals. Jihad, like many other aspects of Islam,
has its theoretical and practical aspects--both being frequently quite apart from one another. In fact, both dimensions are
fragmented as they reflect a much greater diversity in Islam than its proponents, including myself, tend to reflect in their
words. Perhaps all concerned should heed to a hadith by the Prophet: "if you see a wrong: you must right it with your
hand, if you can or your words or with your stare, or in your heart, but that is the weakest of faith." n107
Legal Topics:
For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:
Criminal Law & ProcedureDefensesSelf-DefenseInternational Trade LawTrade AgreementsIntellectual Property
ProvisionsMilitary & Veterans LawMilitary JusticeDefensesSelf-Defense
FOOTNOTES:

n1 The successive rulers of the Islamic state were called khalifa, which means successor by reference to the Prophet as the first ruler of the
Muslim state, the ummah (nation).

n2 Consider M. M. al-Azami, The History of the Qur'anic Text from 'Revelation to Compilation: A Comparative Study with the Old and
New Testaments (UK Islamic Academy 2003).

n3 The purported ahadith reached nearly 250,000 only 150 years after the Prophet's death. Even though these were reduced by the
scholar-compiler al-Bukhari to 7,275 and Muslim to 4,200, some scholars consider only some 40 ahadith, called qudsia (meaning sacred), to
be authoritative. However, the majority of Muslim scholars and most of clerics freely dip into this vast reservoir of ahadith to selectively
pick what they deem most advantageous.

n4 It should be noted that the Prophet's attack on the Madinah-based Jewish tribe of Qurayza cannot be considered self-defense. This tribe
had agreed to peaceful co-existence with the Muslims of Madinah, though they were not supportive of them or their new religion, or of the
Prophet himself. However, their openly verbal disapprovals did not warrant the Prophet-led Mulsim attack on them, which killed all the male
population (estimated at six hundred to eight hundred), and resulted in the enslavement of all women and children. See Hector Avalos,
Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence 250 (Prometheus 2005).
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who led a military coup against the elected civilian president Bhutto, used Muslim fundamentalists to support his military regime. In
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masses of their respective countries. The temporary political gains of these regimes in thwarting secular pro-democracy movements and
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the inherent goodness and tolerance of Islam.
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n10 For the various meanings of jihad, see Lisan al-Arab lil-Imam al-'Alama Ibn Man Dhur (Cairo: Dar Al-Hadith 2d ed 2003), an Arabic
language dictionary and encyclopedia. The original work was published in twenty volumes between 1305-1307 AH. "AH" refers to Anno
Hajira, and 1 AH corresponds to the year 622 CE, which is the year of the Prophet's flight from Makkah to Medina.
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Badr, The Shari'ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J Islamic & Near E L 135 (2002); Wad B. Hallaq, A History of
Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge 1997).
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be considered a form of provocation, which undermines the validity of the self-defense claim against the attack of the Makkans.
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n36 Id at 69:11.
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